The Western Balkans and Greece's foreign policy after 1989
Interview with Prof. Yorgos Christidis on May 16, 2025
University Center for Regional Studies and Analyses (UCRSA)
The University Center for Regional Studies and Analyses at the Sofia University is pleased to present an interview with Prof. Yorgos Christidis, an expert with many years of contribution to the study of the political history of Southeast Europe and a lecturer in comparative Balkan politics at the University of Sofia. He has been researching the political history of Southeast Europe and is a lecturer in comparative Balkan politics at the University of Macedonia (Thessaloniki). During the interview, Prof. Christidis answers important questions related to:
The main factors that shaped Greek foreign policy towards the Western Balkans after the end of the Cold War;
Athens' attitude towards Albania's European integration process;
The long-term effects of the Prespa Agreement (2018);
The dynamics of Greek-Serbian relations after 1989 and Greece's position on Kosovo;
Greece's economic interests in the Western Balkans;
The interview’s transcription is republished with the consent of The University Center for Regional Studies and Analyses and has been slightly edited for the English-language public.
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1406063257189647
Hello, and welcome to the University Centre for Regional Studies and Analyses' channel. My name is Dr Peter Stoilov, and I am pleased to be hosting Professor Yorgos Christidis from the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki today. Professor Christidis is a leading scholar of Southeast European history and comparative Balkan politics, with a particular focus on Greek foreign policy. Today, we will be discussing Greek foreign policy towards the Western Balkans in the post-Cold War era.
Professor Christidis, thank you for joining us today. Let's begin by acknowledging that Bulgaria and Greece are neighbours with deep historical ties, enjoying excellent bilateral relations in recent decades, particularly within the EU and NATO frameworks. However, the regional context poses challenges to the foreign policies of both countries. So, can we start with a broader question? What factors have shaped Greek foreign policy in the Western Balkans since the end of the Cold War? Is there a consistent long-term approach?
Dear Dr Stoilov, Thank you very much for the invitation. I'm really glad to be here.
If you allow me, I will start with a brief comment on your introduction. Bulgaria and Greece indeed have very good relations. I think these relations serve as an example to the rest of the region. As you quite rightly pointed out, we are a difficult region. Despite their difficult past, Greece and Bulgaria achieved a historic compromise and reconciliation after 1945, and have built very close relations since 1991. These relations can serve as an example to the rest of the region, showing that despite differences, states can overcome them if there is political will and move forward.
Now, moving on to your questions about Greece's foreign policy in the Western Balkans since 1989. Most people would agree that the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 caught Greece unprepared. In the first few years after 1990, Greece's foreign policy was preoccupied with two particular issues.
The first was the perceived expansion of Turkish influence in the post-Yugoslav space. The second, much more important issue was the so-called 'Name Dispute'. In other words, relations with the state that is now known as North Macedonia.
The diplomatic questions arising from the name dispute with North Macedonia preoccupied Greek foreign policy until the signing of the Interim Agreement of New York in September 1995. This agreement was the first step towards normalising relations between Greece and North Macedonia. However, it did not solve the name dispute. After 1996, Greece sought to develop its relations with all the post-Yugoslav states, participating in and supporting all efforts for regional reconstruction and reconciliation.
Fast forward to 2003, when Greece held the EU presidency and initiated the Thessaloniki Declaration, which officially recognised that the Western Balkan state should join the European Union — a very important moment for the Western Balkans, as we know. Since then, Greece has generally supported EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. It has sought to develop relations with the states in the region.
After the end of the 1990s, there was a significant influx of Greek investment in many regions of the Western Balkans. This period saw an expansion of Greek capital in Southeastern Europe, including the Western Balkans. This expansion took advantage of the fact that, in the 1990s for example, German capital was much more focused on Central Europe and Russia. This created opportunities for Greek capital to expand into the region, including the Western Balkans, which began at the start of the 2000s.
The beginning of the debt crisis in Greece in 2010 is also a very important date because it meant that Greece had to focus on internal issues such as restructuring the economy and dealing with the debt crisis. This affected the presence of Greek capital in the region, including the Western Balkans, as well as Greece's image in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in Southeastern Europe. Nevertheless, the principles of Greek foreign policy did not change. Greece supports EU enlargement in the Western Balkans.
Thank you for this overview of regional politics. You mentioned some bilateral relations, though. Now, let's delve deeper into that. As the popular saying goes, the Balkans are often described as a 'powder keg', so let's start alphabetically with Albania. You mentioned the EU integration process. How has Greece positioned itself with regard to Albania's accession to the EU? Is Greece a supporter, a gatekeeper, or something in between?
Firstly, we should acknowledge that Albania's post-communist transition hasn't been easy. In 1990, it was the poorest state in Europe and had a very difficult past. It had a 'neo-Stalinist' regime and was the most isolated country in Europe. Its post-communist transition has been characterised by leaders with authoritarian tendencies — a situation that continues to this day — and the establishment of a system rife with nepotism and political favouritism. Add to that the emergence of organised crime and the picture concerning Albania becomes even more complicated.
Greek-Albanian relations have not been straightforward since 1990. From day one of Albania's transition, Greece has certainly been present in Albania in many respects. Many Albanians have become economic migrants in Greece. Until 2010, it is estimated that more than half a million Albanians were working and living in Greece. There is also a Greek ethnic minority in southern Albania. Until 2010, Greece had become one of Albania's closest economic partners in terms of foreign trade and investment. However, post-2010, relations changed due to the debt crisis.
As we said earlier, the debt crisis affected Greece's image in the region. At the same time, Greece became much more preoccupied with its internal issues. Concerning Greek-Albanian relations, what we have seen is that, after the emergence of the crisis, something that had existed in Albania for a long time became much more evident post-2010: namely, the Albanian elite's bias towards Greece relating to a specific narrative concerning the history of Greek-Albanian relations. This has complicated relations with Greece, as there are a number of pending issues that need to be resolved. For example, there is an agreement to be reached on the delimitation of the sea borders between the two states. This is pending due to procrastination on the part of the Albanian government, who are seeking to link this issue with others relating to the past.
This attitude is not helpful and will certainly complicate relations with Greece, as well as potentially complicating the Albanian-EU accession process, given that Greece supports Albanian accession to the European Union.
Thank you for your expert comment. Now, let's move on to North Macedonia, which has always been a hot topic. When North Macedonia signed the Prespa Agreement in 2018, it was considered a diplomatic breakthrough for both countries and the region. From a longer-term perspective, what are your thoughts on the implications of the Prespa Agreement for Greek–North Macedonian relations? Have public and political attitudes in Greece towards Skopje changed?
The Prespa Agreement was a compromise. Compromises never satisfy everyone concerned. In both countries, large sections of the population were unhappy with the agreement. However, it is useful to remember that the Prespa Agreement satisfied some of the basic demands of each side. In the case of Greece, it resolved the so-called 'Name Dispute' by changing the country's constitutional name. In the case of North Macedonia, it resolved issues concerning identity and language by securing recognition of the ethnic Macedonian identity and the Macedonian language from Greece.
The Prespa Agreement is also very important because it not only settled some outstanding issues that prevented full normalisation of relations, but it also contained important provisions for developing a close relationship between the two states. It is therefore a useful guide for how the relationship will develop. Even more importantly, the Prespa Agreement is valuable in that, by resolving political issues, it creates opportunities for the two societies to get to know each other better and to recognise that, while they may disagree on matters such as historical interpretations, they can still find common ground. Nevertheless, they can still work together and move forward for the benefit of all.
As you mentioned, relations with North Macedonia have been challenging. But how have Greek-Serbian relations developed, especially in light of Greece's stance during the Yugoslav wars? The Wars of Yugoslav Succession increased the idea of Greek-Serbian friendship, based on the understanding that we have close religious ties and haven't fought against each other at critical moments, for example during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. For example, during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. However, the idea of Greek-Serbian friendship is not historically accurate. Nevertheless, the idea gained traction and became widespread in Greece during the 1990s.
This understanding of Greek-Serbian friendship culminated in NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999, when Greece did not participate in any military actions against Serbia and widespread demonstrations against NATO's military action against Yugoslavia took place across Europe. Since the removal of Slobodan Milošević from power after 2000, relations between the two states have developed. Greece supports Serbia's EU accession process.
With the opening of the Serbian economy post-Milošević, there has also been considerable interest from Greek investors in Serbia. Greece is also one of the so-called five non-recognisers of Kosovo's independence. This is important for Belgrade. Belgrade values the position of Greece and the other four non-recognisers highly. However, since 2012 and the political dominance of the Serbian Progressive Party and Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia, the country has pursued a unique foreign policy, developing close ties with Moscow, for example. This is very uncomfortable for Greece, given our completely different foreign policy orientation.
You mentioned Kosovo's independence. What are the underlying reasons for Greece's refusal to recognise it? To what extent is this position shaped by ties with Serbia, as you mentioned? Are there also some domestic concerns or broader international pressures at play?
Firstly, among the so-called five non-recognisers, Greece has possibly been the most amenable towards Kosovo. Over the last few years, there have been regular political contacts between Greece and Kosovo. These improved ties with Kosovo have generated expectations in some European and other quarters that Athens might break ranks with the other four states and recognise Kosovo's independence. But this will not happen. Why? Because the reason that existed in 2008, when Kosovo declared independence, is still valid today: any recognition of Kosovo's independence would be problematic. There is concern in Athens that this could affect Cyprus and lead to recognition of the so-called illegal Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Greece will therefore not recognise Kosovo's independence, but will wait for relations between Belgrade and Pristina to normalise first.
Thank you so much for your comment. Now, as we reach the conclusion of our conversation, let's take a step back and return to the broader picture to talk about the economy. What are Greece's key economic interests in the Western Balkans? Are they in energy, infrastructure or banking, or somewhere else entirely?
As I mentioned earlier, after the debt crisis in Greece in 2010, there was a contraction of the Greek economic presence in the Western Balkans, as well as elsewhere in Southeastern Europe. Since 2009, however, there has been a concrete improvement in the Greek economy. Over the last few years, we have seen a renewed interest in Greek investments in the region, particularly in the energy sector. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there has been a lot of discussion about interconnectivity and reducing Europe's dependency on Russian gas and oil. There has been a lot of discussion about building pipelines and pushing forward with interconnectivity in the banking sector.
In this context, an interesting question is what role Chinese investments in Greece play, for example at the port of Piraeus. Do Greek and Chinese economic interests converge or diverge in the Western Balkans?
China has made two significant investments in Greece over the past 15 years. The first is the acquisition of a majority share in Piraeus port by the Chinese company COSCO, which you mentioned. COSCO has successfully transformed Piraeus into the largest Mediterranean port for container cargo. The second investment was the acquisition of a 26% stake in the Greek National Grid by the China National Grid. This is also a significant investment. So, it is clear that Greek-Chinese economic relations are beneficial.
Greece does not receive the same level of attention from China as we see in other Southeastern European countries, such as Serbia, or further north in Hungary. Nevertheless, relations between the two states are very beneficial. However, the relationship is symmetrical in many respects. As in many other cases, China enjoys a huge trade surplus with Greece. China is a global economic superpower. Its interest in the region is evident in projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, in which Greece participates.
Nevertheless, Greece still regards the relationship as very beneficial. Another interesting aspect concerns the perception of the two states as representing ancient civilisations. This provides an additional dimension to relations between the two states. Over the last few years, we have seen a lot of cooperation in this area, such as between universities and the teaching of the Chinese language in Greece, as well as an interest in ancient Greece and China.
This has been very intriguing. Your analysis has also been very thorough. You have helped us to better understand the regional dynamics at play and the complexities of Greek foreign policy. Thank you once again for being our guest. To our audience, please stay tuned for more content from the University Centre for Regional Studies and Analyses.
Thank you, Dr Stoilov. Thank you for the invitation and for the interview. Thank you very much.